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THE LEGAL EXPERIENCE OF AIRPORTS
By CHARLES S. RHVNE*
Airports today are found necessary to the very existence of
our nation from the viewpoint of national defense. Airports are
also a vital and all important link in our transportation system.
The days of landing in cow pastures and hayfields are past and today
our great airports are business enterprises of ranking importance.
The need for larger and better airports and immediate improve-
ment of those now in use is an accepted fact. It is well, therefore,
to pause now and examine the legal rights and duties arising out
of acquisition and operation of airports in order that past mistakes
may be avoided and favorable experience may be recalled and taken
advantage of.
Most of the airports in this country are municipally owned and
operated.' This fact of municipal ownership as contrasted with
private ownership has caused various legal- problems peculiar to
municipal ownership. The legal experience of both private and
publicly owned airports is reviewed herein. The plan of this review
is to follow this legal experience from acquisition of the airport
.through everyday operation and finally to consider the increasingly
important problem raised by the necessity of protecting airport
approaches from obstructions while at the same time giving proper
consideration to the rights of those owning property adjoining air-
ports.
ACQUISITION OF AIRPORTS
A. Privately Owned Airports
In the case of privately owned airports the only legal problem
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar; Author, Civil Aeronautics Act
Annotated (1939); Attorney for National Institute of Municipal Law Officers.
1. As of August 1, 1940, there were 646 municipal, 495 commercial, 282CAA intermediate, 653 auxiliary, 20 Navy, 58 Army,' and 191 miscellaneous
government, private and state airports or a total of 2,345. 1 Civil Aeronautics
Journal 394 (Aug. 1, 1940).
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relating to acquisition which has reached the courts is that of the
right of a private corporation to use the power of eminent domain
to acquire land for airport purposes. Acting under specific Florida
statutory authority, Pan American Airways brought proceedings to
condemn certain private property to be used as an air terminal. 2 The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the power of eminent domain
may properly be granted to private corporations for a public use,
and that the use in this case was public. Hence the court affirmed
the judgment of the lower tribunal in favor of Pan American. As
the analogy here is to cases involving railroads, power companies
and other public utilities which have long been given the power of
eminent domain to acquire needed rights-of-way, obviously the case
is correctly decided.3
B. Publicly Owned Airports
Most of the publicly owned airports belong to cities. State and
county ownership exists only in a few instances.4 Airports can be
acquired by these public bodies by purchase, lease from private
owners, condemnation under the power of eminent domain, and in
rare instances by gift or dedication. Under all state constitutions,
as interpreted by many court decisions, cities and other public bodies
can only expend public funds for a "public purpose". This limita-
tion on the spending of public funds is conceded by all to be a proper
one to prevent use of public funds for private gain. When public
bodies began to spend money for airports a question was imme-
diately raised as to whether such an expenditure was for a "public
purpose". To the credit of our courts it can be said that, with one
recent solitary exception, the courts in every reported case have
recognized the importance of airports to the public and have held
expenditures for airports to be for a public purpose. 5 The excep-
2. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. v. Pan American Airways, Inc.,
137 Fla. 808 188 So. 830 (1939), noted (1940) 11 Air Law Rev. 192.
3. See Huzer, Air Transport Companies and The Right of Eminent Domain,6 Air Law Rev. 302 (1935). Compare Rockford Electric Co. v. Browman, 839
l11. 212, 171 N. E. 189 (1930), noted (1933) 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 111,
where an owner of land adjacent to land condemned for a power transmission
line was denied recovery of damages to his property based on its prospective
use as an airport.
4. See supra note 1.
5. Parker v. City of Little Rock 189 Ark. 830, 75 S. W. (2d) 243 (1934):
Krenwinkle v. Los Angeles, 4 Cal. (2d; 611, 51 Pac. (2d) 1098 (1936) ; Swoger v.
Glynn County, 179 Ga. 768, 77 S. E. 723 (1934). In Wichita v. Clapp, 125 Kan.
100,263 P. 12 (1928), noted (1928) 12 Minn. L. Rev. 549, noted (1928) 76 Pa.
L. Otev. 1004, the court said: "The possession of the airport by the modern city
is essential if it desires opportunities for increased prosperity to be secured
through air commerce"; Douty v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 155 Md.
126, 141 A. 499 (1928) ; Dusart v. St. Louis, 321 Mo. 614, 11 S. W. .(2d) 1045
(1928) *Ennis v Kansas City, 321 Mo 536 11 S. W. (2d) 1054 (1928) ; Bruett
v. Omana 122 Neb. 779, 241 N. W. 561 (1932): Lincoln v. Johnson, 117 Neb.
301 220 !. W. 273 (1928); Hesse v. Rath. 230 N. Y. S. 676 (1928) affirmed
in 49 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342 (1928) ; In re Airport of the City of Utica, 234
N. Y. S. 668 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1929)" Hile v. Cleveland, 26 Ohio
App. 265, 160 N. E. 241 (1927) ; State ex ref. Chandler v. Jackson, 121 Ohio St.
186, 187 N. E. 396 (1930 ); City of Ardmore v. Excise Board, 155 Okla. 126,
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tional case arose in South Carolina last year and held that a county
could not impose a tax to pay bonds issued for the purpose of
improving and extending the Spartanburg municipal airport located
in the county as improving a municipal airport within the county
is not an "ordinary county purpose". 6 It must be conceded that
expenditure of public funds for airport acquisition and mainte-
nance is a "public purpose" for the isolated South Carolina case
is too poorly reasoned to attract more than cursory notice.
Twelve years ago the late Mr. Justice Cardozo in his classic
opinion in the case of Hesse v. Rath7 made this oft quoted state-
ment:
"We think the purpose to be served is both public and
municipal. A city acts for city purposes when it builds a dock
or bridge or a street or a subway. Its purpose is no different
when it builds an airport. Aviation today is an established
method of transportation. The future, even the near future,
will make it still more general. The city that is without the
foresight to build ports for the new traffic, may soon be left
behind in the race for competition. Chalcedon was called the
City of the Blind, because its founders rejected the nobler
site of Byzantium. The need for vision of the future, in the
governments of cities, has not lessened with the years. The
dweller within the gates even more than the stranger from
afar, will pay the price of blindness."
A recent case upheld the power of the City of Denver to issue
bonds to raise funds for the purchase of land to be given to the
Federal government for a bombing school, thus extending the "pub-
lic purpose" to a new situation. 8 In Arkansas the action of two
cities in jointly purchasing an airport has been upheld.9
Use of the power of eminent domain by the Rhode Island
8 P. (2d) 2 (1928) ; Ruth v. Oklahoma City, 143 Okla. 62. 291 P. 119 (1930)
Schmoldt v. City of Oklahoma City, 144 Okla. 208, 291 P. 119 (1930), noted
(1930) 1 Air Law Rev. 481, (1930) 17 U. A. L. Rev. 165. In McClintock v.
Rosenburg, 127 Ore. 698, 273 P. 331 (1929) the court said: "An airport owned
by the city open to the use of all airplanes is for the benefit of the city as a
community, and not of any particular individuals therein. It is therefore a public
enterprise". Reinhardt v. MacGuffle, (Pa. Ct. Com. Pleas, May 2, 1933), noted(1934) 5 Air Law Rev. 87 ; Wentz v. City of Philadelphia, 151 A. 883 (Pa. 1930),
noted (1930) 2 Air Law Rev. 93 ; State Aviation Commission v. May, 51 R. I. 110,
152 A. 225 (1930); City of Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash. 120, 288 P. 258
(1930) noted (1931) 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 94: and State ex rel. City of
Walla Walla v. Clausen, 157 Wash. 457, 289 P. 61 (1930). See Freeman, Estab-
lishment of Municipal Airports as a "Public Purpose", (1930) 1 Air Law Rev.
139; Grover, The Legal Basis of Municipal Airports, (1934) 5 JOURNAL OF
AIR LAW 410.
6. Gentry v. Taylor, 192 S. C. 145, 5 S. E. (2d) 857 (1939).
7. Cited supra note 5.
8. McNichols v. City and County of Denver, 101 Colo. 316, 74 P. (2d) 99
(1937).
9. Ragsdale v. HargTaves, 198 Ark. 614, 129 S. W. (2d) 967 (1939),
noted (1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 517.
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Airport Commission, ° the City of Spokane," the City of Utica, 2
and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 18 to acquire land for airports
has been sustained. A very interesting case recently arose before
the Kansas Supreme Court involving the value which should be
placed upon a private airport which the City of Topeka sought
to acquire in eminent domain proceedings. 14 The question was,
whether the owner should receive the value of the airport as an
airport-its present use-or its use as potato land-a past use.
As an airport the land had little value while its value as potato
land was much higher. In cases where the question has been
raised, either express or implied power has been found authorizing
the acquisition of airports outside the city limits. 15 It has also
been held that having acquired an airport dedicated to public use
the City of Beaumont could not sell the airport to an oil drilling
company so as to destroy the airport use. 16 Two North Carolina
cases have held that while cities in that State may purchase airports
they cannot, without express electoral authority, spend money to
erect hangars on the airport.' 7 Closing of public roadways in order
to have the property to increase the size of airports has been sus-
tained.' 8
C. Lease Agreements
Cities have found it desirable to lease airports and such leases
have been sustained as for a public purpose.' 9 In one case the
court refused to hold that the City of Toledo had impliedly, though
not expressly, renewed its lease of a privately owned airport. 20
Cities have also found it desirable to rid themselves of the
burden of operating a city owned airport and have leased their
10. State Airport Commission v. May, supra note 5.
11. City of Spokane v. Williams, supra note 5.
12. In re Airport of City of Utica, supra note 5.
18. Lutz v. County of Allegheny, 302 Pa. 488, 153 A. 903 (1930).
14. Pugh v. Topeka, 151 Kan. 862, 99 P. (2d) 862 (1940), see digest of
proceedings in lower court and discussion of the valuation problems by City
Attorney Mark L. Bennett, Municipalities and the Law in Action For 1939, pp.
281-287. The court in the decision cited sent the case back to the lower court on
a procedural point and did not decide the important valuation questions.
15. State ex rel. Walla Walla v. Clausen, Hile v. Cleveland, cited supra
note 5 and Sing v. Charlotte, 213 N. C. 60, 195 S. E. 271 (1938) ; compare the
case of People ex rel. City of Watertown v. Gilmore, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 388 (1938),
noted (1938) 9 Air Law Rev. 296 where the city was held subject to real estate
tax on its airport located outside of its corporate limits. This decision is based
upon the peculiar and unusual statute involved, because municipal airports as
property of the public are exempt from taxation. See for example Ky. Laws1929, ch. 77.
16. Moore v. Gordon, 122 S. W. (2d) 239 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
17. Sing v. City of Charlotte, supra note 15, and Goswick v. City of Dur-
ham, 211 N. C. 689, 191 S. E. 728 (1936). Compare: Rehurek v. City of Rapid
City, 65 S. D 542 275 N. W. 859 (1937).
18. Clayton k Lambert Mfg. Co. v. City of Detroit, 34 F. (2d) 303 (U. S.
D. Ct. Mich. 1929) ; Kremer v. New York Air Terminals, Inc 235 App. Div. 796,
256 N. Y. S. 490, affirmed 260 N. Y. 552, 184 N. E. 88 (1932).
19. Krenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles supra note 5, City of Ardmore v.
Excise Board of Carter County, supra note &.
20. City of Toledo v. National Supply Co., 235 C.C.H. §1655 1934 U. S.Av. R. 212 (Ohio Ct. of App. Jan. 22, 1934), noted (1934) 5 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 502.
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airports to private operators. In Kansas it was held that a city
could not lease its airport to a private operator without express
statutory authority,21 and the Kansas legislature immediately gave
such sanction. 22 Jersey City was held to have power to lease its
airport to a private person without allowing the public to bid for
such lease. 23 Hangars erected on airports by lessees are trade
fixtures belonging to the lessee in the absence of any special con-
tract allowing them to become permanent fixtures. 24 In real prop-
erty law permanent fixtures to the land become a part of the prop-
erty of the lessor-owner of the land.
In entering into lease agreements cities should bear in mind
the provision of Section 303 of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938
that:
"There shall be no exclusive right for the use of any
landing area or air navigation facility upon which Federal
funds have been expended."
In other words cities and the private lessee should see to it that
the lease agreement does not grant any one person exclusive-use of
the airport to the exclusion of the general public in order that
Federal funds for the development of the airport may be obtained,
if available. 25
OPERATION OF AIRPORTS
A. Regulations as to Use
Airports as public utilities 26 are subject to such reasonable
regulations as the particular public agency having jurisdiction to
issue regulations for airports may prescribe. Jurisdiction to pro-
mulgate such regulations may be vested in a city, county or the
state. Both privately owned airports and publicly owned airports
are subject to reasonable regulations designed to protect the public
and users of the airport.
The ordinary ordinances or laws of the city or county in which
the airport is located apply as to minor breaches of the peace on
21. Mitchell v. City of Coffeyvllle 127 Kan. 663, 274 P. 258 (1929).
22. Concordia Arrow Flying Service v. City of Concordla, 131 Kan. 247,
289 P. 955 (1930) noted (1931) 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 106.
23. Stern v. kayor and Alderman of Jersey City, 8 N. J. Misc. 307, 150
A. 9 (1930), noted (1931) 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 105.
24. Lamson v. Southern Fire Insurance Co. 137 Kan. 591, 21 P. (2d) 387
(1933) ; United States v. Sweney 8 U. S. Law Week 111 (U. S. D. Ct. Penn.
1939).-
25. McIntire and Rhyne, Airports and Airplanes and The Legal Problems
They Create for Cities Report No. 42, National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers, at pp. 2-4. In addition one interested In this question should contact
the Airport Section, Civil Aeronautics Authority, for changes in interpretations
of this section of the Act.
26. Chandler v. Jackson and Lincoln v. Johnson, both supra note 5; Fixel,
The Regulation of Airports, 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 483 (1930).
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the airport and graver offenses are covered by the usual state laws
of general application. The usual local regulations are those con-
cerning landing, taking off, taxiing, parking, mooring, flight restric-
tions, lighting, fire regulations, starting of engines of aircraft, 27
fees for use of the airport and its facilities, 28 and concession agree-
ments of various kinds for use of various airport facilities. 29 While
it is legally possible to regulate by ordinance or statute the charges
made by all publicly used though privately owned airports, the
charges made so far are so reasonable that such action has not
become necessary. 0 Undoubtedly, with the use of airports increas-
ing all the time, it will soon be both necessary and desirable for
the proper public agency to fix such charges for all airports. There
may be some dispute as to whether cities which are served or own
the airport, State Commissions or some Federal agency should fix
the airport charges.8 '
The court cases involving airport regulations have sustained
the power of cities to promulgate and enforce such regulations.
A case3 2 involving the City of Spokane airport states in part:
"Patrons of the field, whether they be owners of property
abutting upon it or not, have no right in naking. use of the
field to enter it with their ships except at places and in the
manner provided by the rules and regulations of the city or
its managers and agents in control of the field, which regula-
tions may be changed from time to time as necessity and safety
may require."
Chattanooga, Tennessee, has been held to possess implied
extra-territorial power to promulgate and enforce regulations for
the use of the city owned airport. A flyer was arrested, convicted and
27. Failure to use the starting blocks required by regulations constitutes
negligence. Interstate Airlines, Inc. v. Arnold, 127 Neb. 665, 256 N. W. 513
(1934).
28. See for example ordinances of the City of Atlanta, Georgia, and of the
Port of Oakland, California, set forth in full in the Report No. 42, cited supra
note 25, at pp. 24-33. A lien for charges in storing an airplane has been held
superior to a lien for labor and materials. United States v. Curtis Robin Air-
plane No. N. C. 75-A, 1933 U. S. Av. R. 164 (U. S. D. Ct. Fla. 1933).
29. See Schmehl Airport Concession Agreements, Municipalities and the
Law in Action For 1439, pp. 217-220 discussing the experience of the City of
Reading, Penna., and 5 Municipal Law Journal 35 for a review of the expe-
rience of the City of San Antonio, Texas. Those contracting with cities for air-
port facility use must do so at their peril and if statutory, charter or ordinance
provisions are not complied with the private party to the agreement cannot
enforce it. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. City of Newark, 127 N. J. Eq. 106,
11 A. (2d) 119 (1940).
30. See cases supra note 26.
31. See Rhyne, Civil Aeronautics Act Annotated (1939) at pp. 66-70 where
the possible extent and constitutionality of Federal control over all phases of
aeronautics is considered. See also Willebrandt, Federal Control of Air Com-
merce, (1940) 11 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 204 (1940). It has been suggested
that the Federal government assume control over all regulations of local air-
ports by an unusual and extraordinary use of its treaty making power under
the theory of the case of Holland v. Missouri, 252 U. S. 416, 40 Sup. Ct. 382,
60 L. ed. 641 (1920) Grover supra note 5.
32. City of Spokane v. Williams, supra note 5 at p. 261.
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fined for violating the Chattanooga regulations. 3 The City of
Long Beach, California, was held to have the same power with
reference to an airport lying partly within and partly without that
city's corporate limits.3 4 The City of New York's regulation of
airplanes towing banners over the city itself was held a proper exer-
cise of the police power even when exercised to the extent of pro-
hibiting the towing of such banners. 35 This case indicates that any
local regulation which, under local conditions, is reasonable and
necessary for the protection of the health, safety or general wel-
fare of the public, will be held valid. In a damage suit, violation
of a City of Atlanta ordinance regulation as to securing of air-
planes, or having someone at the controls, before starting the
motor, was held negligence per se.36
While a state may prescribe air traffic rules3 7 for interstate
traffic, a statute which fixes no criterion to be adhered to by the
State Aviation Commission in establishing uniform regulations for
airports is void as it violates the fundamental principle of constitu-
tional law that an uncontrolled statutory delegation of legislative
power is void. 8
There are some regulations peculiar to each airport which the
private operator or city operator should promulgate so as to avoid
the tort liability considered in the next section herein. These regu-
lations cover hanging of red lanterns on obstructions or at defects
making runways dangerous or unusable and all other regulations of
a safety nature designed to prevent damage to persons or property
at the airport.
B. Damage Claims for Negligent Injury
The general rule is that the operator of an airport and his
employees must exercise ordinary care as to persons and property
on the airport or respond in damages for all injury resulting from
33. Silverman v. Chattanooga, 165 Tenn. 642, 57 S. W. (2d) 552 (1933),
noted (1933) 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 427, and 4 Air Law Rev. 204.
34. Ebrite v. Crawford, 215 Cal. 724, 12 P. (2d) 937 (1932).
35. S. S. Pike v. City of New York, 169 Misc. 109, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 957
(Sup. Ct. N. Y. Queens Co., 1938), noted (1938) 9 Air Law Rev. 396.
36. T. & T. Flying Service Inc. v. Adamson, 47 Ga. App. 108, 169 S. E.851 (1933), noted (1934) 5 J6URNAL OF AIR LAW 505. In the case of
Ebrite v. Crawford supra note 34, it was held that an ordinance of the City
of Long Beach couid lay down a standard of care required of those using the
airport, but mere violation of the ordinance did not charge a defendant with
civil liability for an accident in a case where the accident could have been
caused in part by the contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
37." Parker v. Granger, 4 Cal. (2d) 658 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935), Appeal
dismissed 298 U. S. 644, 56 Sup. Ct. 958, 80 L. ed. 1375 (1936).
38. State v. Larson, 10 N. J. Misc. 384, 160 A. 556 (1932). See also on
uncontrolled discretion: Schechter Corp. v. United States,.295.U. S. 495, 55 Sup.
Ct. 837, 79 L. ed. 1570 (1935).
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lack of such care.8 9  In Georgia 40 and in Tennessee4 1 cities have
been held not liable for damages caused by negligence of city em-
ployees on the theory that the city in operating the airport is
engaged in a governmental rather than a proprietary function. In
other cases involving cities the courts of Texas, 42 California, 4 3
Oregon,4 4 Oklahoma, 45 Michigan, 46 and Alabama 47 have held that
in the operation of an airport cities are engaged in a proprietary
function and are subject to the same liabilities as a private air-
port operator.
A discussion of governmental and proprietary functions of
cities would serve no useful purpose here. The cases holding that
an airport is just like a street railway or other public utility oper-
ated by cities so the city is liable in damages for failure of its agents
to use ordinary care in operating the city airport are in the ma-
jority.48
While the operator of the airport must exercise ordinary care,
so also must the person using the airport. One injured at an air-
port as a result of his own negligence cannot recover damages from
the airport operator even though the operator is also negligent.49
Recovery against the negligent operator is also barred where the
negligence of the person injured contributed in some way to the
injury.5"
Attempts to define ordinary care are not very useful because
the definition of "ordinary care" depends upon the facts of each
individual case. A review of the reported cases is useful as an
39. See cases cited infra notes 42-47; Logan, The Liability of AirportProprietors (1930) 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 263.40. Mayor, etc., City of Savannah v. Lyons, 54 Ga. App. 661, 189 S. E. 63(1936), noted (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 169. Compare Morrison v.MacLaren et al, 160 Wis. 621, 152 N. W. 475 (1915) holding that one injuredby an airplane exhibition at a State fair could not recover against the members
of the board which sponsored the fair and the exhibition as operation of thefair was a governmental function of the State.41. Stocker v. City of Nashville 174 Tenn. 483, 126 S. W. (2d) 339 (1939),
noted (1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AlI LAW 422.42. Christopher v. City of El Paso, 98 S. W. (2d) 394 (Tex. Civ. App.
19..43. Pignet v City of Santa Monica, 29 Cal. App. (2d) 286, 84 P. (2d)166 (1938), noted (1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 433; Coleman v. City
of Oakland, 110 Cal. App. 715, 295 P. 59 (1930), noted (1931) 2 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 436.44. Mollencop v. City of Salem, 139 Ore. 137, 8 P. (2d) 783 (1932), noted(1932) 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 467.
45. City of Blackwell v. Lee, 178 Okla. 338, 62 P. (2d) 1219 (1936).46. Godfrey v. City of Flint, 284 Mich. 291, 279 N. W. 516 (1938), noted(1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 434.47. City of Mobile v. Lartigue, 23 Ala. App. 479, 127 So. 257 (1930).48. See cases supra notes 42-47. For example, in Coleman v. City ofOakland, supra note 43 at p. 720 the court said: "We have no hesitancy indeciding that in the conduct of an airport the municipality is acting in a pro-prietary capacity. An airport falls naturally Into the same classifcation aspublic utilities as electric light, gas, water, and transportation systems, which
are universally classed as proprietary, Its nearest analogy is perhaps found indocks and wharves."
49. See cases infra 63-72.
50. Ibid.
THE LEGAL EXPERIENCE OF AIRPORTS
indication of the kind of care expected of airport operators and
their employees.
1. Cases Holding Operator Liable
In Michigan"' and Oklahoma5 2 owners of airplanes destroyed
by fires caused by negligence of the airport operator's employees
were held to have a right to recover the value of the airplanes so
destroyed. Where the City of Santa Monica knew that automobiles
frequently drove onto the city's airport runways, yet erected no
fences or other devices to prevent this danger to airplanes, the city
was held liable for damages caused to an airplane which struck
an automobile then on the airport runway. 53 The court declared
that the city could have reasonably anticipated and avoided the
accident. The City of Oakland was held liable for damages caused
by the negligent operation of a city truck being used to improve
the airport.5 4 In Toledo, when an airport employee, while making
an unauthorized flight in an airplane stored in the airport hangar,
crashed the airplane, the airport operator was held liable to the
owner of the airplane for the damage so caused.5 5 An English
case held an airport operator liable for damages to an airplane
where the operator's employees moved the airplane out of a hangar,
in order to remove another airplane, and a fierce gust of wind turned
the airplane over, damaging it in various places. 50 The Court held
that in viev of the prevailing weather conditions, the employees
should have anticipated the danger to the airplane. The Court also
held that absence of any agreement to pay hangar rental for the
space used by the airplane did not relieve the operator from liability
in this case. In California, a twelve year old boy entered the Santa
Rosa municipal airport at night to receive newspapers delivered
by airplane and was injured when struck by the revolving pro-
peller of the airplane (the engine had been cut off but the pro-
peller had not stopped revolving). 7 At the time of the accident,
the airport was without attendants, warning signs or barriers to
prevent free access to the flying field. The court affirmed a judg-
ment for the boy on the ground that the airport operator was negli-
51. Godfrey v. City of Flint, supra note 46.
52. City of Blackwell v. Lee, supra note 46.
53. Pignet v. City of Santa Monica, supra note 43; compare Brickhead
v. Baltimore Air Terminals, Inc., infra note 60.
54. Coleman v. City of Oakland. supra note 43.
55. Ogden v. Transcontinental Airport of Toledo, Inc., 39 Ohio App. 301,
177 N. E. 536 (1931). Second Appeal, Transcontinental Airport v. Ogden, 41
Ohio App. 203 180 N. E. 737 (1932).
56. F. Hills & Sons, Ltd. v. British Airways, Ltd., 1936 U. S. Av. R. $51
(Kings Bench Div., July 23, 1936), noted (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
128.
57. Strong v. Chronicle Pub. Co. et al, 39 Cal. App. (2d) 335, 93 P. (2d)
649 (1939), noted (1940) 11 Air Law Rev. 73. Compare Spartan Aircraft Co. v.
Jamison, infra note 64.
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gent, even though the airport operator proved that the airport
was being operated in the same way as other airports of its class
("rated B-4-X" by the United States Department of Commerce).
In another English case, damages were awarded the owner of an
airplane which crashed through a covering over a concealed stream
which ran through the middle of the airport, as the airport oper-
ator should have known of the danger and corrected it."s In Oregon
it was held to be a question for the jury as to whether the City of
Salem exercised ordinary care in allowing a wire to be erected at
the border of the airport over which one Mollencop tripped and
was injured. If the city did not exercise such care it was liable
to respond in damages for the injuries so caused. 59 So too in Mary-
land where a boy was killed while riding a bicycle across an airport
the Court of Appeals held that the case should be submitted to a
jury to determine whether the airport lessee exercised ordinary
care in failing to warn the boy of the danger before he was hit.6 0
The facts show that an air show was in progress and the boy was
riding his bicycle on an old road which crossed the airport, which
road had not been closed off by the airport lessee, nor had warning
signs or guards been posted to warn the boy to keep off the airport.
Where the city drained water from its airport onto land of an
adjoining landowner it was held liable, in an Alabama case, for
the damages so caused. 61 Employees of airports have been held
entitled to the benefits of Workmen's Compensation Laws and
the operator of the airport is therefore subject to the liabilities pro-
vided under the laws of the state in which the airport is operated. 2
From these cases it can be concluded that an airport operator
has been required to respond in damages to an injured party where
the injury resulted from (a) negligent operation by the operator
himself or his employee acting in the scope of his employment
(b) failure to anticipate and avoid a foreseeable risk or danger
(c) failure to discharge a non-delegable duty to keep the prem-
ises free from dangerous conditions or (4) failure to properly dis-
charge the duty of a bailee in caring for a plane stored in the
custody of the airport.
58. Imperial Airways v. National Flying Services, 1933 U. S. Av. P. 50,
235 C. C. H. §1707 (Kings Bench Div., June 16, 1932).
59. Mollencop v. City of Salem, supra note 44.
60. Brickhead v. Baltimore Air Terminals, Inc et al, 171 Md. 178, 189
Atl. 265 (1936) ; compare Burns v. Herman, 48 Colo. 319, 113 P. 310 (1910) hold-
ing that where a safe place is furnished the public to view an exhibition one
who leaves that place and is injured by supports falling from a balloon cannot
recover.
61. City of Mobile v. Lartigue, supra note 47.
62. Smith v. The Industrial Commission, 235 C. C. H. §905 (Ct. App. Ham-
ilton County, Ohio, Feb. 3, 1936) holds operator of Lunken airport subject to
the Workmen's Compensation Act of Ohio. See also Baum v. New York Air
Terminals, Inc., 230 App. Div. 531, 245 N. Y. S. 357 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1930).
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Some cities, in order to protect themselves against tort liability
in the operation of their airports, have either taken out insurance
covering possible liability or have required lessees, and others using
the airport to take out insurance protecting the city from such
claims.63
(2) Cases Holding Operator Not Liable
An air school operating an airport was held not liable to a
night watchman who ran out to an airplane to help put out a fire
therein and ran into the airplane's revolving propeller and was
killed.64 The court found that the watchman's own negligence
contributed to his death as having been around airplanes so much
the deceased knew that he must always look out for revolving pro-
pellors. In Texas a statute exempting cities from liability for dam-
ages caused by negligence of the city's employees at city owned air-
ports was held unconstitutional. The City of El Paso was held not
liable-to a. spectator at an air show at the municipal airport as the
city had leased the airport to a private operator who was the respon-
sible party since no negligence on the part of the city was proved.6 5
In Tennessee a statute similar to the one declared unconstitutional
in Texas was upheld and a plaintiff who tripped over a wire at the
border of the airport was denied damages for injuries suffered. 6
In Georgia a defect in the roadway to the City of Savannah airport
threw one Lyons off a motorcycle and injured him. The court denied
his claim for damages on the theory that the city in operating the
airport and the roadway was engaged in a governmental function
from which no liability could arise.6 Where the pilot of plaintiff's
plane landed with the sun in his eyes and not being able to see struck
a hay rake negligently left on the runway, the plaintiff could not
recover for damages to the airplane as his pilot was contributorily
negligent in landing when his vision was obscured.68 In New York,
the pilot of an airplane while taxiing down the runway of an airport
collided with a truck negligently on the runway and no recovery
for damages to the airplane was allowed because the pilot should
63. See outline of municipal experience with this question, Report No. 42,
supra note 25, pp. 6-7; Flowers, Tort Liability of Municipalities Owning Air-
ports, Texas Municipalities for June, 1939, p. 154.
64. Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P. (2d) 1096 (1938),
noted (1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 434. Compare contra case of Strong
v. Chronicle Pub. Co., supra note 57.
65. Christopher v. City of El Paso, supra note 42.
66. Stocker v. City of Nashville, supra note 41.
67. Mayor, etc. City of Savanah v. Lyons, supra note 40; Compare the
case of Doss v. Town of Big Stone Gap. 145 Va. 520, 134 S. E. 563 (1926)
where the town allowed the road to its airport to become impassable necessitat-
ing use of a detour, and while using the detour an automobile driver was struck
by a plane attempting to land and killed. The town was held not liable for the
death as forcing use of the detour was not the proximate cause of the death.
68. Davies v. Oshkosh Airport, Inc., 214 Wis. 236, 252 N. W. 602 (1934),
noted (1935) 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 282.
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have seen the truck if he had exercised ordinary care.69 An extreme
case arose in New York where the owner of a house struck by a
falling airplane joined the town of Hempstead as a defendant on
the theory that the town by maintaining an airport nearby invited
the airplane to invade the house. The court upon motion dismissed
the case as to the town holding that no actionable negligence on the
town's part was stated.70 There is a case now pending in California
wherein the City of San Francisco is joined as a defendant with an
airline company in a suit for damages for the death of an airline
passenger in a plane which fell into San Francisco Bay. The plain-
tiff bases its claim to liability of the City on alleged failure of the
City to provide adequate rescue facilities. 71 In Tennessee, a city
was held not liable for damages caused by the negligence of an air-
plane operating from the city airport where the pilot was not a city
employee.7 2
In general these cases indicate that an airport owner will not
be liable (a) if a party injured in connection with the operation of
.is airport was contributorily negligent (b) if the airport is oper-
ated by an independent contractor-lessee or operator and the owner
being sued was not personally negligent and (c) where the operator
is a city or other public body and the operation is classified as a gov-
ernmental function (a debatable proposition in some jurisdictions
and in others not a possible defense).
C. Airport Nuisance Cases
Several cases have arisen in which the owners of land adjoining
airports have brought suit for injunctions charging that noise, dust,
congregation or crowds, and apprehension of danger caused by the
operation of the airport constitutes a nuisance. 73 In one case the
City of Los Angeles brought such a suit against a private airport,
and was successful in having the operation of the airport enjoined
69. lead v. New York City Airport, Inc 145 Misc. 294, 249 N. Y. S. 245(N. Y. Mun. Ct. 1932), noted (1933) 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 276, and(1933) 4 Air Law Rev. 92.
70. Sysak v. De Lisser Air Service Corp., 1928 U. S. Av. IR. 42 (N. Y. Sup.
Ct. Nassau County 1931), noted (1931) 2 Air Law Rev. 509.
71. Gilmore v. United Air Lines Transport Co.. City and County of San
Francisco, et al, 20 F. Supp. 371 (U. S. D. Ct. Calif. 1937).
72. Boulineaux v. City of Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 99 S. W. (2d)
557 (1936). In accord are cases involving suits against those operating fields
for balloon ascensions. See Lansing v. Miller, 140 So. 79 (La. App. 1932)
Smith v. Benick, 87 Md. 610, 41 A. 56 (1898).
73. See cases infra notes 74-79; see also Childs, The Law of Nuisance as
Applied to Airports, 4 Air Law Rev. 132 (1933); Sweeney, The Airport as a
Nuisance. (1933) 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 330; Zollman, Airports, 13 Marq.
L. Rev. 97 (1929). See also, Hubbard, McClintock and Williams, Airports-
Their Location Administration and Legal Basis (1930) pp. 125-130, and com-
pare Capitol Airways, Inc. v. Indianapolis Power and Light Co., 18 N. E. (2d)
776 (Ind. 1939), noted (1940) 11 Air Law Rev. 197, holding that an airport
operator could not force the power company to insulate wires upon poles adjoin-
ing the airport as airplanes flying over the wires were trespassers. An Indiana
statute required insulation of wires at points where the public is liable to com-
in contact with them and it was this law the airport operator relied upon.
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as a nuisance.7 4 Some of the cases have proceeded on the theory of
trespass and have coupled claims for damages with demands for
injunctions.
The earliest case arose in Massachusetts against a private oper-
ator of an airport. The owner of an adjoining country estate sued
alleging that the noise, congregation of crowds and general appre-
hension of danger caused by the airport made use of the estate uncom-
fortable and unbearable. 75 An injunction on a nuisance per se theory
was denied but the court held that flying at low altitudes over the
adjoining property was a trespass. Shortly thereafter a Federal
Court sitting in Ohio followed the same reasoning in finding a tres-
pass is committed by low flying and in addition the Court granted
an injunction on the nuisance theory. 70 The Court indicated that
use of the particular site was not shown to be indispensable and no
impelling "public interest" required operation of this particular air-
port. Again the suit had been brought by the owner of a country
estate, and as an additional annoyance the owner had cited bright
illumination of the field at night. The owner also proved a property
depreciation of $65,000 caused by the establishment of the airport.
These decisions were followed by a Pennsylvania case enjoining use
of an airport as a nuisance and source of continued trespass to an
adjoining landowner and holding the airport operator responsible for
the objectionable acts of others using the field. 7T The Georgia court
refused to enjoin operation of the Atlanta city-owned and operated
airport as a nuisance but stated that the plaintiff might recover
damages actually caused by the operation of the airport.7 8 The court
cited the public interest in and indispensable need for airplanes and
airports and held that one seeking to enjoin operation of an airport
as a nuisance must plead specifically the facts showing the nuisance
as an airport is not a nuisance per se. In California, the court dis-
missed a suit for an injunction and $100,000 in damages against
the city of Santa Monica growing out of operation of the city air-
port by the city's lessee. The court held that the city could not be
held responsible for the alleged acts of the lessor as such acts could
74. People v. Dycer Flying Service, Inc., 1939 U. S. Av. R. 21 (Superior
Ct. Los Angeles, Calif., March 31, 1939), noted (1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW 519 (1940) 11 Air Law Rev. 1 9 5.
75. Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385
(1930), noted (1930) 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 367.
76. Swetland v. Curtis Airport Corp., 41 F. (2d) 292 (U. S. D. Ct. Ohio,
1930) modified 55 F. (2d) 201 C. C. A. 6th, 1931), noted (1931) 2 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 82 (1932) 3 ibid 293, and (1932) 3 Air Law Rev. 151.
77. Gay v. Taylor, 19 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 31, 1934 U. S. Av. R. 146, noted
(19341 5 Air Law Rev. 380 and 4 ibid 86.
7 Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934), noted
(1934) 5 Air Law Rev. 209.
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not reasonably have been anticipated at the time the lease was signed. 79
A suit for $90,000 against the Burbank Airport and airlines using
it was dismissed on the ground that flights over the plaintiff's adjoin-
ing land at from 5 to 175 feet in height is not a trespass but is lawful
unless actual damage to the land is proved.80
It is clear from the cases that an airport is not a nuisance per
se but may become a nuisance by the method of its operation. The
public interest in continuance of the airport is a strong factor in all
cases and the inconvenience to the individual seeking the injunction
is weighed against this public interest. Each case has been decided
upon its peculiar facts and the best conclusion that can be drawn is
that an airport must be operated in such manner as to cause as little
inconvenience as possible to adjoining property owners and if the
annoyance and damage to the adjoining property owners is so great
as to constitute an unbearable burden and nuisance the operation of
the airport will be enjoined in cases where the public interest does
not require its continued use.
PROTECTION OF AIRPORT APPROACHES
The protection of airport approaches offers one of the most
pressing of current airport legal problems."' With the increase in
size of airplanes and the advent of instrument landing the need for
either larger airports or removal of obstructions surrounding air-
ports is growing all the time as the gliding angle in landing of larger
planes and planes using instrument landing facilities is naturally
longer. The problem of purchasing additional land to enlarge exist-
ing airports raises almost insurmountable financial objections and
the answer to the need for more space in which to land and take off
from airports has been sought in the less costly use of the police
power to control height of structure on property adjoining the air-
port. In most instances airports have been located in sparsely settled
surroundings and the growing importance of air travel or factors
of city expansion have caused a movement to locate various busi-
nesses and homes adjacent to the airport in recent years.
Control of the height of structures adjacent to airports which
79. Meloy v. City of Santa Monica, 124 Cal. App. 622. 12 P. (2d) 1072(1932), noted (1933) 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 111, (1933) 4 Air Law
Rev. 64.
80. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, Same v. United States Airlines Trans-
port Corp. 84 F. (2d) 755 (C. C. A. 9th 1936), cert. den. 300 U. S. 654, 57 Sup.
Ct. 431, 81 L. ed. 865 ( 1 9 3 7), noted (1956) 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 624.
81. See Report No. 42, supra note 25; Elliott, Unobstructed Airport Ap-
proaches, (1932) 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 207; Rohfling, The Airport Ap-
proach, (1933) 4 Air Law Rev. 144 ; Schmidt, Public Utility Air Rights, (1930)
1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 52; McIntire and Rhyne, Airport Approach Mate-
rials, Report No. 59, National Institute of Municipal Law Officers (1940) ; Heth-
erton, The Zoning of Landing Fields, The Commonwealth Review (1939) a*
p. 180.
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are erected out of "spite" has met with unanimous success and
these cases are considered first herein. The more difficult problem
of control of the height of adjacent structures by use of the police
power or other methods is then considered.
A. Spite Structures
Several cases have arisen involving the right of the operator
of an airport, either municipal or private, to enjoin the erection
of structures on adjoining lands out of spite and malice on the part
of the adjoining landowner. In most of these cases the adjoining
landowner is attempting to force the operator of the airport to either
lease or purchase his property and in all cases where actual malice
and spite had been proved, courts have granted injunctions against
the obstructions erected by the adjoining landowner insofar as they
served no useful purpose other than to prevent or render dangerous.
the use of the airports.8 2
In the absence of height restrictions in zoning regulations, to
be considered in the next section, there is no rule of law which pre-
vents a landowner from building any structure upon his land to any
height so long as such structures are for the reasonable use of his
property.88 It has long been a rule of the common law that one
cannot use his property as to injure his neighbors, and there are
many cases restraining the erection of spite fences or requiring the
one erecting such a fence to take it down.84 In one case, acting
under statutory authority the Kentucky court granted damages for
the erection of a spite fence. 85 Statutes prohibiting spite structures
or fences have been sustained as a proper exercise of the police
power.88
A recent case decided by a Federal Court sitting in California
held that poles erected on land adjoining the airport 20 feet high
and connected by wire were erected out of spite and malice and
were not intended to serve any useful purpose; hence the poles
must be taken down by the landowner who erected them. 8 7 In this
case the landowner was trying to force the airport to lease or buy
82. See cases infra notes 87, 89. 90.
83. Lasola v. Holbrook, 4 Palge (N. Y.) 169 (1833) ; Forbell v. N. Y. City,
164 N. Y. 622, 58 N. E. 644 (1900) ; Gannon v. Hagardon, 92 Mass. 106 (1865) ;
Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (1856). Compare: Rockford Elec. Co. v. Brow-
man, supra note 8.
84. Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439 (1909); Buch v.
Mockett, 95 Neb. 552 145 N. W. 1001 (1914); Kralikowski v. Tide Water oii
Sales Corp., 251 Mich. 684, 232 N. W. 223 (1930); Hubbard v. Holliday, 58
Okla. 244 158 P. 1158 (1916).
85. ftumphrey v. Mansbach, 265 Ky. 675, 97 S. W. (2d) 573 (1936).
86. Bar Due v. Cox, 47 Cal. App. 713 190 P 1056 (1920) Whitlock v.
Uble 75 Conn. 423, 53 A. 891 (1903) ; and karasek v. Pejer. 22 Wash. 419. 61
P. 3 (1900).
87. United Airports of California, Ltd. v. Hinman, (U. S. D. Ct. S. D.
Calif. April 29, 1939) quoted in full in Report No. 59 supra note 81 and 235
C. C. H. 11829.
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his unused adjoining property after losing a suit for damages based
upon low flights over the property by users of the airport. 88 In
Pennsylvania the owner of property adjoining an airport erected a
"spite" tower 8 feet square and 154 feet high; this tower fell and
he erected a new one 90 feet high which was burned down and suit
was brought by the State, the owner of the airport, to enjoin erec-
tion of any more such structures on the ground they were a nuis-
ance. 89 The court granted the injunction. In a similar case in Iowa
a decision was entered restraining the adjoining landowner from
erecting structures or growing trees over 25 feet in height as such
erection or maintaining "would not constitute a proper use and enjoy-
ment of the defendant's premises and would not be necessary for its
enjoyment". 90 The landowner had planted fast growing trees expected
to reach the height of 35 feet and higher so as to make it dangerous
to use the airport. After the injunction limit of 25 feet was made,
the landowner is reported to have erected a pole 24 feet 8 inches
high topped by a fluttering red flag.9 1
A suit to enjoin New York City from planting trees along a
newly opened street running parallel to plaintiff's airport was dis-
missed on the ground that the airport operator had not proved the
malice and spite which he had alleged motivated the city.92 The
court further pointed out that the trees did not interfere with the
operation of the airport as the plaintiff had claimed.
One must conclude from these cases that proof of actual spite
and malice must be made and if such proof is made the offending
landowner must take down at his own expense the obstruction he
has erected.
B. Methods of Control of Height of Structures Adjoining Airports
Ten possible ways of controlling the height of structures or
trees which interfere with the use of airports have been suggested.9 3
These are: (1) Voluntary action by owners of property adjoining or
near the airport, (2) Purchase of all land near the airport, (3) Pur-
chase of airspace rights over the land near the airport, (4) Acquisi-
tion of the land near the airport by use of the power of eminent
domain, (5) Acquisition of airspace rights over the land near the
88. Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, supra note 80.89. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader v. Von Bestecki,30 Pa. Dist. & Co. Rep. 137, 1937 U. S. Av. R. 1. (Pa. Ct. Comm. Pleas, Dauphin
County, 1937).
90. City of Iowa City v. Tucker, 1936 U. S. Av. R. 10 (Dist. Ct. Johnson,Iowa, 1935), noted (1935) 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 622, (1936) 36 Col. L.
Rev. 483, (1936) 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 293.91. Note (1937) 7 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 293. 294.92. Air Terminal Properties v. City of New York, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 62.(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) noted (1940) 11 Air Law Rev. 195.
93. See Report No. 42, supra note 25. pp. 7-20.
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airport by use of the power of eminent domain, (6) Police power
condemnation of hazards dangerous to those using the airport, (7)
Zoning regulations, (8) Use of Commerce Power by the Federal
government, (9) Use of War Power by the Federal government,
and (10) Use of the Postal Power by the Federal government. Of
these methods those receiving the most serious consideration at the
present time are the purchase or condemnation by eminent domain
proceedings of airspace rights, zoning regulations, and use of the
Commerce power by the Federal government. These methods are
considered separately below. Voluntary action by adjoining land-
owners has proved effective in Austin, Texas; Chicago, Illinois;
Fresno, California; Richmond, Virginia and other cities, 9 4 but such
action is neither certain nor uniform. Purchase or condemnation by
eminent domain proceedings of all land upon which hazards to the
use of the airport may be erected is fiancially impossible in nearly
all cases. Police power condemnation of hazards to the use of air-
ports depends upon a finding of fact and conclusion of law that the
particular hazard condemned is a public nuisance. In the spite and
malice cases reviewed above,95 it is easy to find such a public nui-
sance, but in the ordinary case, with spite and malice absent, courts
are, and should be, reluctant to condemn structures under the police
power, as the property owner receives no compensation and must
take down the structure at his own expense. The drastic nature of
the use of police power condemnation does not commend it except
in cases where the motives of the one erecting the hazard can be
questioned. Use of the War power by the Federal government to
protect airport approaches as a part of the national defense program
commends itself only in time of emergency and even then practical
and financial difficulties are bound to arise90 in any attempt of the
Federal government to police the nation's airways in such a wide-
spread fashion. While "all air routes which are now or hereafter
may be in operation" are declared to be post roads, and criminal
penalties are provided for wilful retarding of the carriage of mail,97
still it is believed that practical, legal and financial difficulties also
make use of the Federal postal power to protect airport approaches
an undesirable method."8 In-cases like those involving spite struc-
tures where there is a wilful act of retarding the mails, however,
94. Ibld, pp. 9-10.
95. Supra notes 87, 89, 90.
96. See Report No. 42, supra note 25, p. 20.
97. Act of June 8, 1872, Chap. 335, Sec. 200-205, 17 Stat. 308, as amended
by Act of June 23, 1938, Chap. 601. Sec. 1107(a), 52 Stat. 1027, 39 U. S. C.
§481.
98." See Report No. 42, supra note 25, p. 20.
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prosecution of those erecting such structures under the statute just
referred to may be both feasible and desirable.
(1) Purchase or Condemnation of Airspace Rights Under Eminent
Domain Power
The purchase of an easement of way or airspace rights over
land near airports is much less expensive than the purchase of the
adjoining land itself, but the difficulty is in arriving at the value of
such airspace rights. How much is it worth to a property owner to
erect buildings to any height he desires on land adjoining the airport?
In instances where airports are located in sparsely settled or resi-
dential areas it would seem to be financially undesirable to erect tall
buildings while in other instances the airport may be located in an
area where tall buildings are desirable. In acquiring airspace rights
the same problem of valuing the rights arises, but this problem is
not insurmountable and steps should be taken to try out this method
so as to determine by experience its practicability. One objection
to condemnation proceedings under the power of eminent domain
is that court action is necessary in each case with resultant costs
for expert witnesses on value of the rights condemned and other
expenses of such litigation. While some states have authorized the
purchase or condemnation by eminent domain of airspace rights, 99
others have authorized similar action to acquire individual hazards
to the use of airports so that such hazards can be taken down.1 00
If a hazard is purchased and taken down it would seem that the
landowner selling the hazard could be restrained from erecting a
new hazard at the same place under the spite structure cases. 10'
(2) Zoning Regulations
In order to protect airports from the danger of interfering
structures erected by adjoining and adjacent landowners the idea
has been evolved of promulgating zoning regulations limiting the
height of all structures surrounding airports.10 2 In nearly all juris-
dictions the validity of reasonable zoning regulations under the police
power of cities (by virtue of properly delegated authority) for the
99. The Uniform Airports Act adopted in many states and a 1939 statute
of Idaho, quoted in full in Report No. 42, supra note 25 provide such authority.
100. Ala. Laws, 1931, No. 136, §11, 1931 U. S. Av R. 303, authorizes cities
to condemn: "Any structure, building, tower, pole, wire, tree, woods or other
thing, or portion thereof located within one-quarter mile of such airport.-
Me. Laws 1931, c. 213, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 361, authorized use of eminent domain
to acquire easements and air rights. See Report No. 42, supra note 25 and theIdaho statute quoted therein. Ohio Laws, 1931, No. 601, §3939 (22) provides
that cities may: "purchase, lease or condemn land and/or air rights necessaryfor landing fields, either within or without the limits of a municipality."
101. Supra notes 87, 89, 90.
102. See Report No. 42, supra note 25, pp. 11-19 for a comprehensive
review of the problems raised. Also see Wenneman, Municipal Airport (1931)
p. 465 et seq.; Hubbard, McClintock and Williams, supra note 73, at p. 127,
and the authorities cited supra note 81.
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benefit of the community as a whole have been sustained.103 The
reasoning of the courts has been that property rights are relative
rather than absolute and the individual property owner must give
up some of his rights when such giving up is for the benefit of the
community as a whole including the individual property owner as
a member of the community.10 4 The term "community benefit" is
to be defined as embracing not only commercial and social advantages
but also the health, safety and general welfare of the community-
in airport approach protection, the factor looming largest, is safety.
The airport zoning idea is an extension of this idea of community
benefit in that such regulations assure the entire community of the
full benefits of air commerce and air defense by preventing struc-
tures surrounding airports which would otherwise so limit the use
of the airport as to deprive the community of the benefits of air
commerce and air defense.
Under zoning plans for cities there have been established busi-
ness districts,, residential districts, industrial districts, etc., and these
have been subdivided into various classes. The airport is necessarily
a commercial or industrial activity, while at the same time the phys-
ical characteristics demanded of the area, in which it must properly
be located, are those of the undeveloped or of most restricted resi-
dential sections. In connection with city planning and zoning for
the protection of airports, it is suggested that the public interest in
the "airport use" is so great, the area involved is so extensive, and
the characteristics of the neighborhood necessary for efficient opera-
tion and development are so peculiar and nevertheless definite, that
a new category should be accounted for in city planning and zoning;
i. e., an "airport use district". 10 5
Some professional planners and zoners have attacked the use
of the term "zoning" as applied to airport approach protection, 10 6
and of course one may define the term either broadly to include all
planning or limit it narrowly to include planning of a definite and
accepted type. No quibbling over terminology need concern the advo-
cates of airport approach protection as the important thing is to give
the idea a fair trial in practice. It would seem that an "airport use
district" fits in well with general planning of cities just as well as
the accepted present classifications such as industrial, business, or
103. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (2nd ed.) §§1051-1053 where
the cases are collected.
104. Ibid §§1025-1048.
105. Report No. 42, supra note 25, p. 2.
106. See American Society of Planning Officials News Letter, Sept. 1939,
p. 78, also ibld, October 1939, p. 81 and The American City, June 1940, p. 119;
John M. Hunter, The Relation of Airport Zoning to Community Planning and
Zoning, Address delivered at Southwestern Airport Planning Conference, Dallas,
Texas, April 8, 1940.
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residential and the various subdivisions of each. An airport use
conditions the area surrounding the airport just as does industrial
and other uses.
At least thirteen cities have adopted specific zoning regulations
to control the height of buildings at or near airports and at least
eleven states provide by statute for the use of such power. 0 7 In other
cities and in other states the power to adopt such regulations may
be implied from other ordinances or statutes on zoning, but in case
of doubt as to existence of the power, the better practice is to secure
a specific delegation of power to enact zoning regulations for this
purpose, since cities in particular have only those powers specifically
delegated to them or necessarily implied from the powers dele-
gated. 108
The only court decision to date arose in Baltimore and held that
a state zoning law which prohibited erection of buildings within one
hundred feet of the border of that city's airport and restricted the
height of buildings at greater distances was unconstitutional as a
confiscation of property. 0 9 The court in that case declared that the
zoning regulations were promulgated for the benefit of those inter-
ested in aerial transportation rather than for the general public
benefit and on this particular point, the court was, of course, in
error. If the court's opinion was based upon confiscation in that
structures within one hundred feet of the airport were prohibited
entirely, the result is arguable but the court's reasoning as to the
class of persons benefited by the airport zoning regulation is erron-
eous. The decision is by a court of original jurisdiction and no appeal
was taken.
To date no court of final jurisdiction has passed upon the
validity of airport zoning regulations and the validity of such regu-
lations must be determined by reasoning from court decisions upon
107. The cities are: Newv York City, Chicago, Los Angeles, Indianapolis,
Philadelphia, Akron, Oakland, San Diego, Seattle, Clifton, N. J., Dearborn,
Mich.. and Fresno and Glendale, California. The states are: Alabama, Connecti-
cut, Florida Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana. Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska
and Pennsyfvania. See Survey of State. Airport Zoning Legislation by John M.
Hunter, Report No. 42, supra note 25, where these statutes are discussed and
analyzed.
108. See Report No. 59, supra note 81.
109. Mutual Chemical Company of America v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, et al., 1939 U. S. Av. R. 11 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore, Jan. 25, 1939). noted
(1939) 10 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 424. The Attorney General of Michigan
issued an opinion on June 24, 1937, to the Governor of Michigan reading in part
as follows: "The Act prohibiting erection of any structure with height greater
than a ratio of one to twenty to the distance laterally to the nearest boundary
of airport operated as airline terminal without permission of state board of
aeronautics and any structure within 100 feet is contrary to fourteenth amend-
ment of the federal Constitution and to Article 2, Section 16, Michigan Consti-
tution as an invasion of property rights.' In Report No. 42, supra note 25, at
pages 15-16 an opinion of the Oakland Port Attorney Markel Baer upholding
the legality of airport zoning regulations is quoted In full.
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general zoning regulations. 110 Because of the predominant factor
of public safety involved in elimination and prevention of hazards
in airport approaches one can also use as authorities the decisions
sustaining general police power regulations based solely upon public
safety for their justification."'
It is believed that airport zoning regulations offer the best solu-
tion to the problem of protecting airport approaches, after such
approaches are cleared of existing obstructions by purchase or use
of the power of eminent domain. Some suggestions have been made
that such regulations be made retroactive so as to eliminate existing
obstructions, but such retroactive effect is too drastic an application
of the police power for it unreasonably affects property owners who
have erected or maintain existing hazards in the approaches of air-
ports without the motives of spite or malice already referred to.
The one case on airport zoning has inserted the idea of confiscation
and has given advocates of airport zoning a burden of proving in
each case that the height regulations are a reasonable exercise of the
police power rather than confiscation of property. There is no com-
pelling need for making this burden larger by attempting to push
the theory of zoning too far and in effect confiscate existing struc-
tures. Let the zoning regulations be to eliminate future hazards
and use the methods of purchase and eminent domain to eliminate
existing structures in all cases except where the existing structure
was erected and is maintained for reasons of spite and malice.
(3) Use of the Federal Commerce Power
It has been suggested that the Federal government could, under
its power to regulate and remove obstructions to interstate com-
merce, prohibit the erection and maintenance of all hazards to the
use of aircraft at or near airports which are used for interstate
travel. Since most travel by aircraft is interstate in character, this
exercise of authority by the Federal government would have far-
reaching consequences. 112
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 is based upon the power of
the Federal government to regulate commerce among the states."13
Section 1101 of the Act provides as follows:
110. Report No. 42, supra note 25, McQuillin, supra note 103; compare
People v. Dycer Flying Service, Inc., supra note 74. Another interesting case
is that of Lehmaier v. Wadsworth, 120 Conn. 571, 191 A. 539. 1937 U. %. Av.
R. 42 (1936), noted (1937) 8 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 502, where it was held
that land used as an airport prior to a zoning ordinance, and not thereafter
put to a "conforming use" could be used again as an airport despite the zoning
ordinance after a lapse of 4 years, the ordinance providing that existing non-
conforming uses of land might be continued. The airport was a non-conform-
ing use.
111. McQuillin, supra note 103, §1016 and §981.
112. Report No. 42, supra note 25, p. 19.
113. Rhyne, supra note 31, p. 66.
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"The authority shall, by rules and regulations, or by order
where necessary, require all persons to give adequate public
notice, in the form and manner prescribed by the Authority,
of the construction or alteration, of any structure along or near
the civil airways where notice will promote safety in air com-
merce."
This section is intended to protect airways from hazards to air
travel, and is undoubtedly intended to apply to airport approaches
themselves.
Acting under this section the Authority on July 16, 1940 adopted
a regulation requiring persons planning construction or alteration of
structures on or near civil airways to give 15 days notice to the
Authority of such construction or alteration. 1 14 The following eval-
uates this regulation :115
"Because of the difficulty of enforcement and because the
regulation does not prohibit erection of hazards, the effect of
the regulation is not expected to carry much weight, although
it is a small step in the direction of protecting areas surrounding
landing fields ...
"A CAA official admitted that enforcement of this regula-
tion will be very difficult since there is no machinery for such
purposes. It also will be difficult to notify all farmers within
three miles of every landing area on or within 10 miles of a
civil airway.
"Added to this is the fact that the CAA does not prohibit
114: Sec. 1. Any person who engages in the construction or alteration of
any structure located within three miles of the nearest boundary of any landing
area along or within 10 miles of a civil airway, which structure or any part
thereof is already, or may become by reason of such construction or alteration,
of a height above the level of the landing area, greater than one-fiftieth of the
distance of the structure from the nearest boundary of the landing area, shall,
prior to the beginning of such construction or alteration, give written notice
thereof to the Civil Aeronautics Authority and to the manager, or person in
charge of such landing area: Provided, that this regulation shall not apply to
any structure which is less than five feet in height above the level of the landing
area.Sec. 2. The notice shall be given at least 15 days prior to the date on
which construction or alteration is to begin. Tile notice shall contain: (a) The
approximate date upon which, by reason.pf the construction or alteration, the
height of any part of the structure above the level of the landing area will
exceed one-fiftieth of its distance from the nearest boundary of the landing
area; (b) a detailed descripfion of the location of the structure or the site
thereof with reference to the landing area, including the direction and distance
therefrom; and (c) a general description of the structure when completed,
including a statement of maximum height above the level of the landing area:
Provided, that In the case of an emergency requiring the immediate construc-
tion or alteration of any such structure such information may be given to the
nearest inspector of the Authority and to the airport manager by telephone,
telegraph, or in person, and the written notice submitted thereafter.
Sec. 3. As used in these regulations the term "landing area" shall mean
any landing area, as defined in Section 1 (22) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938 which is equipped for the operation of aircraft at night or which has a
landing surface at least 2000 feet long and at least one permapent building
devoted to aeronautical purposes.
Sec. 4. This regulation shall become effective July 16, 1940.
115. American Aviation for August 15, 1940, p. 8.
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the erection of hazards. The information is supposedly obtained
for purposes of informing pilots in the notices to airmen.
"Most residents of the U. S. haven't the remotest idea
whether they are, or are not, on or near a civil airway, one
observer said."
Analogies to Federal safety regulations for railroads and to
Federal control over navigable streams has been suggested to sup-
port the legality of Federal regulation on this subject. 116 In these
cases of railroad or navigation safety the regulations promulgated
have for the most part affected only those actually operating the
railroad or the ship and no nation-wide policing has been undertaken.
Police regulation has been left to the states and cities as they are
on the ground and best fitted to enforce such regulations. Even if
one concedes the legal validity of such far-reaching regulations
under the Federal power to regulate interstate commerce, the prac-
tical problems of enforcement of such regulations are too great.
While the national uniformity possible by Federal regulation is
desirable it would seem that local regulations by local agencies fa-
miliar with local conditions and necessities are also desirable. It is
not believed that Federal regulation in this field is either desirable
or practical at the present time. The local authorities are also familiar
with the workings and enforcement of zoning regulations from
experience in promulgating and enforcing such regulations, while
the Federal government has no experience in this field.
CONCLUSION
Conclusions from the legal experience in acquiring, operating
and protecting the approaches of airports have been stated in each
section of this review. The legal experience of airports in the future
will necessitate changes in these conclusions to fit such experience
and undoubtedly new legal problems will arise in the future to match
and overshadow those of the present. The law relating to airports
is now only in the making and a fascinating picture indeed is re-
vealed to one who watches this law unfold and grow into a body of
legal principles which by experience have proved to be best for the
governing of airports and the public.
116. Report No. 42, supra note 25, pp. 19-20.
